The ‘best’ airliners (i.e. those with the least difference
between inbound and outbound flights) showed in their logbooks a defect ratio
between inbound flights and outbound flights of 75% vs 25%, but much worse
results have occured.
This meant that the number of reported defects and failures on
inbound flights would be three times as high as on outbound flights. That is
very hard to believe, especialy as these were only the best airliners. One
would expect that the ratio between inbound and outbound errors should be
50%-50%, within a certain deviation.
This was the reason for Secretary-General of the AEI Fred
Bruggeman, who works in daily life at Schiphol airport, The Netherlands, to step to the press and report this seemingly
fraudulent and potentially life-threatening behavior of airliners.
After Bruggeman had spoken with Dutch Business News Radio
(www.bnr.nl), I had the pleasure of having a personal, in-depth conversation
with him on this topic. I present an almost integral version of this interview
for the benefit of the readers:
Ernst: Is there a
dangerous situation around Schiphol airport, Amsterdam as a consequence of this
behaviour by airliners?
Fred Bruggeman: No, the
danger should not be exaggerated. In the ‘low hazard zone’ around Schiphol live
about 10,000 people. In comparison: in the same low hazard zone around O’Hare
airport at Chicago, Illinois, live 1.5 mln people. The chance that a crashing
airplane hits people is 150 times as big in the Chicago region, as at Schiphol,
The Netherlands.
Still, I have worries
about the occuring situation: defects have not been written down at the moment
they occured, but at the time that suited best to the airliner. That means in
practice: on the way back to home-port.
This led to airplanes
flying around with defects, that should not have flown without taking the
proper actions.
This practice happens
in serious numbers: around the thousands.
My colleagues of the Australian
Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association (ALAEA) have reported on an
investigation at Qantas, that 92% of the defects written down in flight
logbooks occured at inbound flights and only 8% at outbound flights.
Ernst: could you say that
the 8% of the defects that actually has been reported on outbound flights was
more serious than the other reported defects?
Bruggeman: that is hard to say. In aircrafts most
systems have been created redundantly. There are often one, two or three backup
systems that can take over the tasks of failing systems. So there is not an
acute problem here. However, sometimes defects have not been written down that
should have been written down.
A bigger problem is
when failing systems were not shut down that should have been shut down. This
is what happened with Turkish
Airlines, flight 1951 on February 25, 2009.
Explanation: A
defected radio altimeter that operated the autothrottle (an autopilot that
steers the engine power), thought that the Turkish Airlines Boeing 737 plane
already had landed at the moment the plane was still airborne. It had misinterpreted the altitude of the plane. The misinformed autothrottle reduced the gas
to idle. When the pilots would have seen this malfunction during the landing
procedure, there would have been no accident.
However, the pilots had their attention somewhere else and
noticed the malfunction too late to take decisive action. Later, the news was
spread that the altimeter had malfunctioned before and should have been shut
down. Then one of the redundant altimeters could have taken over its function. Alas, this didn’t happen.
Ernst: Do you think that
airliners deliberately not report incidents?
Bruggeman: Yes, I do.
Clear incidents have been discussed at a congress of our community. There is
photographic evidence and evidence of reports to the authorities. In spite of
the fact that very serious cases have been reported, the authorities didn’t take
any action to it.
Bruggeman: Concerning
Ryanair, it worries me even more what has not been reported. When we announce serious
problems at the authorities, we hear that we don’t have evidence. It is like
you call the police to announce a murder case, only to hear that the police
doesn’t show up without proper evidence in advance.
Even if we lay the
evidence on the table, than it remains hard to get the authorities in motion.
Aviation authorities don’t want to have monkeys on their back.
Ernst: That is why you
sought the publicity?
Bruggeman: Exactly,
sister organizations of ours have signalled huge problems with outsourced
maintenance of Quantas in Singapore, Malaysia and Hongkong. Planes return with a
large number of malfunctions after such a maintenance operation. This is not good.
Authorities execute
audits only once per two years: they look if the procedures are on paper
neatly. As if…
You need to actually
see what happens. Don’t believe the good stories on paper. Talk is cheap. There
are enough procedures, but what if they aren’t used? How people work in
reality, that is the main story.
Authorities are afraid
to damage their relations with the airliners. We, the maintenance personnel,
have the right to demand maintenance information if we are suspicious. However,
if we demand it with evidence in hand, the authorities answer they can’t give it,
because ‘it would hurt the relation with the airliner’. This is bad for safety.
We want to disclose this, instead of sweeping it under the carpet.
The authorities don’t
want to disclose it, as they have difficulties sanctioning the national airliners.
These airliners can make mischief, but walk away from it without sanctions and penalties.
If you hit them where it hurts, you get a change in behavior. As long as this
doesn’t happen, nothing will change.
Ernst: Is it the fear of
disturbing the good relations between the aviation authorities and the national
airliners? Or are they afraid to spoil the reputation of aviation safety?
Bruggeman: It’s a combination.
If the authorities acknowledge there is a problem, they have to act. They are
accessory when they acknowledge problems without acting to it. If they deny
having problems, they don’t have to. The sad fact is that the air engineers can
show logbook after logbook.
One airliner showed
88% problems inbound against 12% problems outbound. The worst airliner showed 98%
problems inbound, against 2% outbound. What should happen before a problem is
written down in the outbound log?! Only engine malfunctions are written down in
the outbound log. That is worrying us. There is NO airliner where the logbook
is balanced out between inbound and outbound flights. The ‘best’ we saw was 75%
inbound vs. 25% outbound.
Ernst: Is there not a
whistleblower protection when these kinds of fraud are reported?
Bruggeman: We have
numerous examples. On paper there is protection for whistleblowers, but in reality
they are on their own. The authorities state:”you have to take care of yourself”,
when you have a problem with your employer. In The Netherlands it means, when
you lose your job as an air engineer, that it is very, very hard to get a new
job in the same line of business. That effectively stops whistleblowers in these trying
times.
We have colleagues
that trust us, but don’t trust the authorities. When an engineer announces
serious defects on an airplane in a letter to the authorities, these authorities visit his superior
with his letter. They state: “your man is stating this and that’. The poor guy
loses his job afterwards!
Another problem is
that audits are announced in advance weeks before they are executed. You know
what that means, right?! Everything is spic and span when the auditors appear…
It would be a different story when they would drop in at Friday afternoon
unannounced and asked to inspect the logbooks. That doesn’t happen, however.
Everybody that denies
the problems, we dare to pick one day at one airport at random and check the
first three planes that drop in at 16.30 h (4.30 pm) and the first three planes
at 17.00 h (5 pm). We are happy to do so together with the airliners, the ILT (Dutch
aviation authority) and us. We will tally the scores of inbound and outbound
defects in the logbooks of these planes.
When it is better than
60%-40% inbound vs outbound, I’ll gladly apologize. But there is no airliner, nor
the ILT, that dares to do this investigation with us.
Ernst: Do airliners still
use inferior spare parts?
Bruggeman: No, this one
is under control. With each and every spare part it must be possible through a
badge to trace it back to the moment of arrival, the supplier and the
manufacturer.
Ernst: Also in the Far
East?
Bruggeman: They have the
same processes. However, one of the problems is: the authorities that execute audits
there, are not well-trained enough. When my colleagues walk with these authorities as representatives of
their company during a large maintenance operation, they see whole different
things than these authorities.
Our colleagues in
Australia received an airplane from a large maintenance operation in the Far
East. A very large inspection had been executed. When the plane came back,
there were still 400 (!) defects in it. They were neatly mentioned on a separate
list, but were not processed in the logbooks.
Ernst: Were there serious
defects on this list that make the airplane less airworthy?
Bruggeman: Yes, they were
definitely there. Companies cheat with the quality of education and personnel.
The FAA enters once per two years and checks one page of the company’s logbook from
A to Z. This is OK, but what about the rest of the book?
Authorities focus on
paper procedures and not on reality. Their personnel often lacks the inside
knowledge. We spoke with Dutch ILT people; you would expect that they have an
aviation background, but they don’t. People from waterworks went to the
aviation authority and vice versa. These greenhorns execute audits and are
looking like ‘an ape to a Swiss watch’. Say goodbye to experience.
Such an inspector
fails when he has to ask difficult questions: he doesn’t understand the answer
he gets and therefore cannot assess it. I’ve seen this happen.
Ernst: To me it seems
very hard to balance the high costs of maintenance with the low profits or even
losses that airliners make nowadays?!
Bruggeman: That is a
problem. When you don’t filter out the misfits among the airliners, they pull
everybody down. Sadly, I can’t mention names to you as this could cost foreign
colleagues their job. We are not protected sufficiently. We would like to do
naming and shaming. We have pictures and evidence. We use this evidence. We sit
around the table with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regularly.
Then we put our evidence on the table. Not for copying, but for looking at it.
But at this moment, it is everything that we can do. If we publish our
evidence, we don’t have control upon it anymore. If we show it to the EASA we
remain in control.
Ernst: Could things go
wrong in The Netherlands, again? Like with TA-1951?
Bruggeman: It is
calculation of probability. The chance for a plane crash is still much smaller
than the chance for a car crash. We like to keep it that way.
A worrisome
development is currently, that safety systems like check-and-recheck are
abolished at maintenance companies, in order to reduce costs. There is less and
less supervision by well-trained/well-educated people in the hangar. Then you get lesser
quality.
Check-and-recheck was
introduced for security reasons. Now it is cut away, as it costs money: more
people in service, more people educated. When these kinds of safety systems are
abolished, it is waiting for an accident to happen again.
Ernst: Are the
pricefighters (Ryanair, Easyjet etc.) not in a way responsible for the
diminishing revenues of airliners?
Bruggeman: When you allow
pricefighters to your airport and you don’t check the things they do, then
things go wrong. Our checks are a very good indicator for what happens at a
company. When you check fifty logbooks and of those, 85% of defects is at inbound
flights and 15% is at outbounds, you know that something is 'fishy' in their
operation. The only ones that can influence these logbook data at an outpost are the pilots,
who execute their preflight check.
When you suspect
logbook fraud by an airliner, you could say: I see this happen. Now I want to
compare the logs with the Flight Data Recorder (FDR – one of the black boxes in
a plane).
Pilot X reported a
problem with the aircondition / pressure system, but recorded it only on the way
back to homeport. I can see at the FDR that – for instance - the airconditioning
already had been switched off during the outbound flight. Such a malfunctioning
system delivers warning signals and the procedures advise the pilots to switch
it off. This can be seen at the FDR. When this doesn’t correspond to the
logbook, you have detected a case of fraud.
This means that you
have to know your business as an authority and you must have the guts to
penalize company x, where large political interests can be at stake.
Ernst: When all airliners tamper with their
logbooks, you have to penalize them all?
Bruggeman, Yes of course.
It has come to this. When no airliner gets penalized for tampering their logs,
nobody changes their behavior. When the FAA executes an inspection in the USA
and you didn’t execute a certain inspection XYZ, you get a $6000 fine.
However, when you didn’t
execute this inspection for one hundred times, you get one hundred times this $6000
fine. On top of that you are mentioned negatively at the FAA website. That
hurts!
The European EASA
doesn’t have the possibilities to administer such fines. They can only revoke
the whole license of the aviation company. What would happen if the EASA
revoked Lufthansa’s aviation license, for instance? Hell would break loose and
the inspector in question could kiss his job goodbye.
Still, the only way to
change behavior among airliners is to penalize them with ever heavier fines and
penalties, when the misbehavior remains. Then you change those companies.
For the record, BNR
spoke with Director Aviation Edwin Griffioen of the ILT (audio link in
Dutch). He said that the ILT didn’t recognize the problem. Here is a
translated snippet of this interview:
Director Aviation
Edwin Griffioen of the ILT (Inspection for Living environment and Transport)
doesn’t recognize the problems. ‘We invited Mr. Bruggeman 1.5 years ago to
visit us. He addressed the same problem at that occasion. We took this very
seriously.
The ILT started an
investigation themselves, according to Griffioen. “We informed also at
co-authorities if they recognized this problem. There was a Danish
investigation and an EASA investigation. From all three investigations we found
out that it wasn’t true. We can’t find the assertions of Mr. Bruggeman in the
data.”
I’m not an aviation expert. The only thing I know is that I
talked with Fred Bruggeman for more than half an hour. In that half hour he
made an expert impression on me and the impression of someone who is genuinly
worried about the safety situation in the air. He doesn’t seem the kind of
person that creates a media hype to attract attention to him and his Air
Engineers International community.
I consider him absolutely credible and I’m almost certain
that his conclusions are spot on.
Unfortunately, politics will probably only react when another plane
comes crashing down, as a consequence of faulty equipment or lacking
maintenance.
Until that dreadful day, it will be business as usual. That
is sad, but true.
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