The
tragic demise of ‘three store chains for the ‘common, middle class man’, V&D, MacIntosch and DA drugstores in The
Netherlands and the simultaneous success of both high end, ultimately luxury,
stores and the low end stores chains, like Action, Big Bazaar and Primark, points
at the emergence of a wishbone world in
the Dutch shopping landscape, in which it becomes fatal to be ‘stuck in the
middle’.
Clowns
to the left of me, Jokers to the right,
Here
I am, stuck in the middle with you.
This week was a particularly gruesome day for three renowned,
very large and long existing store chains in The Netherlands.
MacIntosh, the owner of several shopping formulas and chains of
shoewear, home decoration and lifestyle stores – with over 400
stores in The Netherlands and 130 stores in Belgium/Luxemburg
– filed for a Chapter 11 status for its head office and for its shoe- and
lifestyle storechains Dolcis, Manfield, Invito, PRO Sport en Hoogenbosch
on Tuesday.
At the same time, MacIntosh warned its shareholders
that the possible yields of a ‘shopping formula firesale’ would hardly be
sufficient to pay back the outstanding debt of MacIntosh itself. In other
words, the marked-to-market value of the exchange traded MacIntosh shares would
end up being close to nought. This news was enough to blow the remaining value
of the stock to smithereens and fulfil this ‘prophecy’.
Such a Chapter 11 status enables MacIntosh to legally
put a temporary payment stop on the incoming invoices and other amounts due for
MacIntosh and its storechains, in order to acquire time to investigate and
improve the financial situation and acquire new sources of funding in the
meantime. Although some companies actually survive a Chapter 11 status, for
most companies it is the ‘last bus stop’ before reaching the inevitable bankruptcy.
V&D, the large Dutch chain of department stores, ended an already terrible business
year in style by also filing for a Chapter 11 status
yesterday. By doing so the formerly grand department store chain nearly ended up in the
abyss with their 60+ department stores and their hundreds and hundreds of
personnel members, while letting down thousands of customers, who still own – now worthless – V&D
gift vouchers.
And last, but not least, there was the central head office
of DA Drugstores which also filed for Chapter 11 yesterday, due to the fact that the currently
266 independent franchisers of the formula could not pony up enough income for the headoffice to survive independently.
All the stores of the DA drugstore chain in The Netherlands Picture courtesy of: www.fd.nl Click to enlarge |
Without this organization, all franchise-owners of the DA
formula become ‘headless organisms' and on top of that they will soon run dry of goods,
as virtually all the supply lines for new store stock dry out immediately. On top of that, their
central administration and accounting will not be managed anymore, meaning that all the
independent stores must acquire the centralized parts of their store
administration and accounting on their own computer systems. The latter is really a hell of a
job and often almost impossible.
Although by itself the future of the independent DA stores is
officially not at stake, this nearing bankruptcy of their head office
means ‘de facto’ that a devastating blow has been administered, as these stores
can hardly survive without their head office.
With the (expensive) Christmas days and New Year quickly
approaching, this was terrible news for all thousands of personnel members of
these three store chains, as well as for the numerous shareholders and the suppliers
and other creditors, who can probably wave goodbye to a large share of their
investments.
And as the following infographic created by HetFinancieele Dagblad shows, these three store chains are not just the next ones
in a long, long line of store chains going bankrupt during the last few years; no,
in this line V&D is undoubtedly the largest store chain to perish in sales
numbers as well as personnel members.
Infographic of large store chains going bankrupt since 2011 Picture courtesy of: www.fd.nl Click to enlarge |
So even though 2016 should be the year of the
definitive return to economic prosperity for the Dutch economy as a whole, the
year could not have started worse for the people involved in this three
companies.
Among the so-called ‘fatal flaws’ of these companies,
the most obvious one could be that neither of them was able to adopt a good online(i.e. internet) strategy with accompanying online portals, to attract the many young and
middle-aged customers who prefer to do most of their
non-food shopping online. So that they could beat the Zalando’s,
Bol.com’s, Wehkamp’s and other “successful” internet retailers (i.e. successful
as in high sales figures, as being profitable is often another ball game for such
online stores).
However, that is only half of the story in my humble opinion. As the
following chart with calculated sales figures (based on indexed 2013 sales numbers for both online and B&M stores) from the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics shows, the sales of the combined internet stores is still only
around 10% of the total brick & mortar store sales, in spite of its fast growth.
So it is not fair to
state that increasing internet sales alone is solely responsible for demolishing the ‘old-fashioned’
B&M stores.
Calculated Sales development of B&M stores vs Online stores in The Netherlands Data courtesy of: www.cbs.nl Chart by: Ernst's Economy for You Click to enlarge |
While I have spent an article or two
about
both the dangerous circumstances for and fatal flaws of such massive store
chains like the aforementioned ones, there is another very interesting side to
the current, enduring chaos in the Dutch retail landscape.
This side is what we could call the wishbone world in
which the Dutch shopping landscape has ended.
The wishbone world of the Dutch shopping landscape Infographic created by: Ernst's Economy Pictures courtesy of: www.veendammer.nl, www.jongordon.com Click to enlarge |
At the highest end of the wishbone, there is the
enduring and considerable success of the Italian and French designer stores,
the brand stores, the luxurious jewellers and bodywear stores and other
extremely expensive lifestyle shops for goods of impeccable quality and
sky-high prices: jewellers and luxury good stores like Cartier, Schaap & Citroen,
Luis Vuitton
and Tiffany or high-end fashion shops like Chanel, Gucci, Ermenegildo Zegna or Rive
Gauche and their likes.
These are all stores meant both for people for whom
a budget is never concern at all and for
people who want to show off to their friends with the wrappings and the
shopping bags of these brands, which are almost as desirable as the goods that
these brands sell themselves.
At the low end of the wishbone, there are store chains
like Primark, Big Bazaar, Voordeelwinkel and Action, which sell fashion and low
end lifestyle/consumer goods and household appliances against the lowest prices, for
people who can’t or won’t afford to buy something more expensive.
Also these chains are very successful in fulfilling their
own mission of being the drainage canals for mass produced low end fashion and consumer
goods (i.e. “container goods”) from the low-wage countries (i.e. countries like
China, Vietnam and Bangladesh), as well as for the remaining stocks and
surplusses of bankrupted store chains and shops.
The shops that are ‘stuck in the middle’ of the Dutch
shopping landscape are either surviving by price-stunting their brains out –
like for instance the famous “Kruidvat” drugstores, which litterally move from
one price-action to another, hoping to earn back their losses from the other same
store purchases that people do when they are in the Kruidvat stores – or they
lead an increasingly lingering existance, fighting against higher bills and
lower sales figures. These are formerly very successful store chains like Blokker and
Hema, who now also seem to be on a dangerous path towards their future demise.
Many municipalities, exploitation companies for
shopping space and interest groups for the retail industry look at these
developments concerning V&D, Hema, Blokker, DA and MacIntosh with feelings
of shockedness, disbelief and pain.
However, these developments all seem an inevitable
result of the enormous, unhealthy increase in shopping space of the last
decades, as well as the “Blokkerization” – the increasing monotony and dullness
of Dutch shopping centres as a consequence of always the same store chains
occupying most of the available shopping space – of the Dutch retail industry.
Even though the economic crisis seems to have finally come
to an end, I think that the shakeout in the Dutch retail industry must and will
continue, in order for it to become healthy again. This is a painful, but yet
inevitable process!
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