Yesterday, I wrote the first part of this article about our family
trip to Russia in the midst of the Ruble crisis.
Today, I will continue the second part with some first hand stories of the uncurable corruption
and bureaucratic failures in Russia, which makes real economic change and
progression so very hard. Afterwards, I will print the pertinent snips from
a must-read economic outlook for 2015, written by Sergei Serebrov in the Russian online newspaper Utro.
Dima, a friend of ours, is a medical doctor who has
worked as an administrative clerk at a central purchase department for
hospitals in St-Petersburg. He told us a tell-tale anecdote about the purchase of X-ray
machines for a number of these hospitals.
“Some
time ago, the central purchase department needed to purchase new, very
expensive X-Ray machines for the hospitals in St-Petersburg.
You must know; when in Russia an official purchase happens, it almost always takes place according
to the following scheme: the official price is for instance ₽100
million, but a discount of ₽20 million is negotiated between the
persons representing buyer and seller. The buyer officially pays the ₽100 million, while the seller officially accepts the ₽80 million that they negotiated. Hence, the buyer and the seller divide the ₽20
million profit among eachother and each party walks away with ₽10
million in profits for his own piggy bank.
Unfortunately,
however, in this case the people of the purchase department purchased the wrong
machines, with the wrong specifications and measures. These machines were
unusable for the hospitals in question.
So
what happens? These machines are now stored somewhere outdoors, where wind, ice
and rain can cause havoc upon the sensitive electronics. As a consequence, their value has
probably dropped to virtually nought. The hospitals still need their X-ray machines, but
somebody is counting his money coming from the first purchase. And now the same scheme will happen all over
again. Welcome to Russia.”
This whole scheme of corruption was confirmed through
another story, coming from another friend of ours, who works in a museum.
“My
museum has a few fountains in the garden, which use water coming from the
water supply in the museum itself.
The waterpipe network and the manually operated installation for these fountains were
subject to some serious maintenance, so the museum called company one for this
job.
The
representative of company one drew a tormented face when the current state of
the waterpipes was discussed and told the museum that the whole watersupply
needed to be renewed with new waterpipes and a new, electronic start-stop system for the fountains.
As the waterpipes needed to be installed in the floor, together with the installation of the electronic
regulators, this was a costly operation of ₽xx million. The museum got the budget from the city and company one got the refurbishing job.
After a few weeks of installation activities,
company one told the museum management that one very important part of the installation was
missing. This new part would cost the museum another ₽xx million. Of
course the fountains were not working, but company one was told to hit the
road anyway.
Now
company two comes into the equasion. The representative of company two drew
also a tormented face and told the museum management that the installation of
the pipes in the floor, as well as the already installed electronic equipment, were totally
useless for the job.
Hence,
a totally new installation was needed, which would cost the museum another ₽xx
million. Again the museum got the budget and company two got the job. This
company also messed up somewhere in the process, so now the museum had two
non-working water installations and still the old water supply for the
fountains.
Enter
company three and the story goes on and on…
The
most shocking thing was that both company one and company two had close ties to
members of the museum management, when they were hired. I was so angry that I
complained at the museum management and at all kinds of other public officials,
but nobody cared to listen, because everybody is involved in such corruption schemes.
They
don’t fire me, because I am one of only two persons that know this museum by
heart and I am the only one capable of running the place. Nevertheless, nobody
wants to hear my story. When there is a simple crack in the museum wall, which
can be repaired for only ₽5000, they order a complete wall replacement,
because this yields national funding money to friends and family of the museum
management”.
It is this kind of corruption that makes so many
Russians sick to the bone. It is not the Italian mob-style of corruption where
people get threatened or murdered, but a kind of ‘petty’ embezzlement of money. Almost nobody wants to know the truth, because it is just too lucrative: everybody is
in for a slice of the pie, except for a few fools who are too honest for such schemes.
Changing this behaviour is virtually impossible…
The Russian online newspaper Utro had a revealing
interview with economist Sergei Serebrov about 2015. In his words, 2015 will be
‘a
year of disaster’. Here are the pertinent snips of this revealing
interview, translated by Google Translate and turned into English by me.
The
current political and economic model is only able to operate in conditions in which there is a constant flow of resources from outside.
The
current economic crisis in Russia, resulting from a combination of both objective
and purely subjective reasons, does not give grounds to hope that the current status
quo, which existed since Vladimir Putin came to power, can be preserved.
The
reason for that lies in the rapid depletion of the resource base that funded the
existing economic system. The current form of capitalism, which can be called ‘crony
capitalism’, could merely exist due to the constant and growing influx of
export-based funds and foreign loans.
Now that this influx has diminished, it
is the question whether the economic system will survive. This will require new
resources; probably coming from small and medium businesses and from the Russian population.
How this will happen, is told in the following old joke: when a man is fired
from his job, his son asks: “Dad, will you now drink less Vodka?”. Reply: “No,
son… YOU will eat less”. The role of the son in this joke is for the entire Russian
population.
However,
in terms of impact, these "sources" of funding money are no match for the funds coming
from the oil and gas exports. It will be virtually impossible to keep up the
full bureaucratic apparatus that emerged during recent years. This means that
the population will have to pay much more taxes, fees and levies.
However,
a fundamental redrawing of the power pyramid, under the influence of changing
circumstances, is unlikely during the coming year. In the worsening
economic crisis, this will be a serious test for the head of the state and his
image in the eyes of the population.
In
2015, Putin will get in a contradictory situation. To preserve the stability of
his power he must improve, or at least not worsen the relations with the West. On the other hand, however, he must maintain the image of the west as an external enemy for
domestic purposes, in order to let his political campaign be successfull.
Annexation
of Crimea not only turned out to be a powerful action to improve the president's popularity
among Russians, but it also offsetted unwanted claims to the entire political system
and its main actors. At the same time it was clearly ‘one bridge too far’ for the
rest of the world. At some point, the European change in opinion about Russia has become so disturbing, and
sometimes even dangerous for the Kremlin that it abruptly slowed down its
geopolitical activity.
It
is likely that all of this will be continued in 2015. Putin will be forced to
convince the West of the need to "hush up" with respect to the
Crimean issue. This is perhaps the only topic on which the Russian president
will not make any concessions, because otherwise he risks losing the support of
a large part of the country.
Instead,
it is possible that the West will be offered compensation in the form of a
settlement with respect to the "Ukrainian issue" at terms more
favorable to Kiev, Brussels and Washington. Very presumably, the Novorossiya project
will be closed. For some time, it will be used as a PR tool in the country
itself, but in its foreign policy Moscow will try to distance itself from this
project completely.
This whole article is an absolute must-read in my
opinion, as it sheds an interesting light on the Russian motivations that have
been in play the current Russian/Ukrainian conundrum. It also sketches the
bleak economic future that lies ahead of both Russia and the Putin regime, for
this and perhaps the next few years. Even if the oil price rebounds, it seems
that the years of above average growth and conspicuous consumption are over in
Russia.
What will come instead, will remain the question for the
coming years. One thing is certain; if Russia wants to have a healthy economy, with
a financially healthy middle class and sound small and medium enterprises, it
needs to fight the ubiquitous corruption that poisons the whole economy: top
down and bottom up. These witness stories are a tell-tale testimony for that.
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