Economic growth in The Netherlands and the ‘economic windchill factor’: the difference between what seemingly is and how it feels for Jan Modaal (aka Joe the Plumber)

A few weeks ago in The Netherlands, we received the fantastic news that the Dutch economy had been growing by no less than 0.1% in 2013Q3. People cheerfully marched through the streets or hooted their car horns in sheer celebration.

Can you see the picture of this before your very eyes? I can’t either; probably because it isn’t so.

Today, I have been talking with one of my Twitter friends about the difference between the official data upon the Dutch economy and how this particular economy feels to the general public.

I called this phenomena the ‘economic windchill factor’, as it is akin to the natural phenomena, in which a temperature of -2 centigrade can feel like -20C, when humidity is high and the wind is very strong.

Currently, the economic windchill factor is extremely high: although the official economic data speaks of slow growth, Jan Modaal (the Dutch Joe-the-Plumber) feels in reality that the economy is in a state of depression.

To show you what I mean, I present just a few news items from roughly the last month. This list is not complete yet:

• KLM Cargo sells four planes and scraps 2800 jobs;
• Insurance behemoth Achmea scraps 4000 jobs;
• Philadelphia Healthcare scraps 900 jobs;
• FrieslandCampina dairy scraps 174 jobs
• MSD scraps 140 jobs at former Organon factory in Oss
• 14.000 jobs will be lost in the child care industry between early 2013 and 2014/2015
• UWV, the Dutch center for Work and Income starts a national campaign to warn people about the consequences of involuntary dismissal and unemployment
• Approximately 50% of employer’s sees further reduction in personnel
• A report on the growing poverty in the Dutch society is presented by the Dutch Social-Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) [I will come back to this topic in the coming days – EL]
• Number of suicides soars among unemployed and disabled persons, living from welfare 

I want to put especially this last news item, which was published earlier today, in the spotlight; it is a tell-tale story about the depression-like atmosphere in The Netherlands, since 2008

Remarkable numbers of suicides among the disabled

People, living from public welfare, commit more often suicide than people with a job. Suicide is five to eight times more common among men and women with public welfare or disability payments.

Civil servants at the municipal social service departments must be trained to recognize people with suicidal tendencies. This is concluded by GGD (municipal mental health service) The Hague, the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Leiden University Medical Centre in a study that has been presented to the public today. These institutes analyzed the social-economic and demographic characteristics of all people, that passed away between 2002 and 2011, as a consequence of suicide. In these ten years, it concerned 15,178 people; four per day in average.

“We had anticipated upon a few peaks among the people living from welfare, but these differences are indeed remarkably big”, according to investigator Renske Gilissen of GGD The Hague. “The general picture is that single men are more often suicidal, but receiving welfare is also a very important factor. Suicides happens 4.5 times more often among men who receive welfare payments and more than 6 times more often among women on welfare.

The cause is not fully clear to us: people who receive unemployment benefit are already vulnerable, but people receiving welfare or disability payments are even more vulnerable. Having no job can lead to suicidal feelings, but depression and suicidal feelings can also lead to people losing their jobs. Unfortunately, cause and effect cannot be retrieved anymore. However, for measures of prevention it does not matter so much”, according to Gillissen.
 

To gather the statistical data belonging to this article, I checked out the wonderful Statline database of the Central Bureau of Statistics.

Although it was not possible to retrieve the reason for committing suicide from this database, it nevertheless supplied me with some useful information.

Please check out the following charts:

Average number of suicides per age group in the period 2002 - 2012
Data courtesy of: statline.cbs.nl
Charts created by: ernstseconomyforyou.blogspot.com
Click to enlarge

Annual number of suicides in the period 1950 - 2012
Data courtesy of: statline.cbs.nl
Charts created by: ernstseconomyforyou.blogspot.com
Click to enlarge

There are at least three easy conclusions that can be drawn from these charts:

• The amount of men committing suicide, is more than double the amount of women, in general;
• In 2012, the numbers of men committing suicide were at an all time high; I suspect that these data will even be higher in 2013;
• Most suicides take place roughly between the ages of 35 and 60: not coincidentally (in my humble opinion) the period in which most people have growing up children.
• Consequently, it is the period in which unemployment and dependency on welfare and disability payments hurt most (especially for men as main wage-earners in most families)
• Especially the feelings of shame, that they let their families down, could be an extra motivation for men to commit suicide.
• For women, this motivation might not count so much, as women can often fall back on their generally accepted role as ‘housewife’.

What also could have influenced the soaring numbers of suicides since the seventies, is the growing feeling that ‘living at the state’s expenses’ is like sponging on society: something to be ashamed of. However, this cannot be deducted from the data in these charts and is therefore pure speculation on my behalf.

The news in this article was shocking for me, but not particularly surprising, as it seem to fit in these depression-like times, with their merely relentless, neoliberal governments.

At the moment, there are roughly three groups of people in society:

• People that do have well-paid steady jobs and/or steady sources of (high) income, without having worries of defaulting or being fired;
• People, who have a poorly paid job, which hardly supplies them with enough income to nurture their families, or whose (flexible) job is currently on the line and whose outlook for a new, better paid job is only moderate;
• People, who are currently unemployed and / or who are living from welfare and disability payments or people that have massive excess debt and don’t know how to get out of this situation with their current and future income.

Category 1:

These people have more than enough money to live from today and in the near future, when nothing out of the ordinary happens to them. If the people in this category didn’t squander their money on oversized houses or on bad investments, excessive consumption or private loans, they probably don’t have any worries and don’t feel the economic windchill factor at all.

These people could continue consuming like in the years before the crisis, although they might have adjusted their consumption patterns to these much more austere times (exuberance is ‘not done’ anymore, in most circles).

Although these people generally complain about the increased taxes and social security premiums, it does not stop them from maintaining their current lifestyle.These people can be found in the upper classes and higher middle classes.

Category 2

For the people in the second category, the economic windchill factor is much stronger currently. Due to their awkward future, when it comes to income and job-security, and their vulnerability for the austerity measures and increased taxes coming from the central and local governments, the crisis feels like a real crisis to them.

Most of these people hang on yet, especially when there debt is not too high, but a few unfavourable events could push these people firmly into group three. But for now, they don’t feel the political pressure and when everything stays alright with their job, these people will come through the crisis without major problems.

These are people, who diminished their general consumption, especially when it comes to durable consumption goods, cars and (expensive) vacations abroad. When it comes to food and daily consumption goods, their consumption patterns stayed roughly the same.

These people can be found in the lower middle classes; especially among youngsters and people under 30, often with intermediate vocational education.

Category 3

This is the group where the economic windchill factor is the strongest.

The unemployed people (especially the ones, who receive welfare or disability payments) feel the political pressure coming from the conservatives and neoliberals, who see these groups as ‘spongers on society’ and ‘losers’: people, who can’t catch up in the ‘participation society’ of Mark Rutte, as they can’t take care of themselves financially.

They also feel the financial pressure, coming from soaring expenses and diminishing purchase power, due to the various austerity measures and tax increases from the central and local governments and the soaring energy costs.

Besides that, these people are under increasing scrutiny from government checks and controls, as their right to receive their welfare payments is mistrusted (in advance) by the local and central governments. More and more often these people are forced to accept ANY (underpaid) job, or else…

The penalties for doing something wrong in the process, concerning their welfare payments, are soaring and sometimes these people could even lose their only source of  income for one month or more. This threat, together with the diminished welfare payments and higher taxes, can often lead to a near-poverty state for these people, which they can’t get out anymore.

Also the indebted people feel victimized by the crisis: they thought to do the right thing in the past until 2008 (“everybody did it, so we did it too”), but it blew up in their face.

These people are now stuck with excess private debt and / or with a large mortgage on a house that is structurally underwater.

Although the interest payments on their debt are still relatively low, their (probably) diminished income makes it very hard to do these payments after all; especially in this time of deflation (!), in which their debt is increasing in value while their income (aka purchase power), might become (much) lower.

These people belong to the soaring group of people that is on the brink of defaulting. Poverty is looming for them.

The people in this category belong mostly to the lower (middle) classes, although it also happens to older workers from the higher middle classes, who became involuntarily unemployed and afterwards couldn’t find a job anymore.

Summarizing, there are are currently lots of people for whom the crisis has turned into a real depression, with a very high economic windchill factor. Their immediate future looks grim and the chances that this economic depression will end very soon, are extremely dim. 

These are the people, who need an understanding, empathic and decisive government. A government, which helps them to get through the crisis, by supplying financial aid and taking all kinds of reforming measures that help the economy improve in the short and mid-long term.

Unfortunately, these people got Cabinet Mark Rutte II, of which BNR’s Kees de Kort said today, that ‘it can be accused of anything, except of being too vigourous in their reforms’.

Süddeutsche Zeitung: ECB wants to lend money for special purposes, like industrial and small & medium enterprises. Here is why this won’t help the economies in Europe to recover anyway.

This story is a little bit older, as it is from Wednesday, 27 November 2013, but it is nevertheless very interesting. That is the reason that I print it here:

The German daily newspaper ‘Süddeutsche Zeitung’ reports that the ECB council, chaired by President Mario Draghi, is interested in opening a special purpose, long-term lending facility.

The goal of this lending facility would be to enable commercial bank loans to industrial and SME companies (Small and Medium Enterprise), all over Europe.

Here are the pertinent snips from the article in the 'Süddeutsche', translated by me:

ECB plans special purpose lending facility for bank loans

The interest could hardly be lower than today. Now, the ECB council is discussing what other means are yet available, in order to stop the euro-crisis. 

One of the solutions could be, that new creditlines will only be enabled by the ECB, when the receiving banks agree to use the money for financing industrial companies and small and medium enterprises.

The Süddeutsche Zeitung has learned from insiders in the matter, that the ECB council is considering to deploy another massive lending facility with a long maturity rate – a so-called LTRO. 

The big difference of this LTRO with previous ones would be, that only banks would receive money, which forward this money as a loan to industrial and small and medium enterprise companies. This would be the first time that the ECB would enable such a special purpose lending facility: a possibility that has been explicitely allowed in the statutes of the ECB.

Among European politicians, as well as among the executives of the ECB itself, there are many opponents against this particular plan. These people point at the fact that the ECB would enter dark territory. ‘When you start such a facility, where will it end? Would the ECB eventually subscribe that the money could be lended to hairstylists, but not to solar studios?” 

Earlier experiences have also not been really encouraging. The Bank of England earlier established a comparable program with the name ‘funding for lending’. Most merchant banks said “thanks, but no thanks!”.

ECB officials, on their behalf, pointed at the fact that two earlier LTRO’s from the ECB hardly ended in the real economy, like they should have. The almost one billion euro of these LTRO’s had been used for other, more lucrative investments. Especially south-European banks used these inexpensive loans to buy domestic sovereign bonds and cash the difference in interest-rates between the ECB and the sovereigns: a so-called carry trade.

According to an investigation of the DZ-Bank, Spanish financial institutes currently hold approximately 34% of all Spanish sovereigns bonds, while Italian banks increased the volume of domestic sovereigns to €415 billion, from €240 billion in 2011. Irish (60+%) and Portuguese (51+%) banks executed the same carry trade. 

This business in particular is very rewarding, as banks don’t need equity capital as a financial risk buffer for these state loans, in contrary to loans for industrial and SME companies, which do require such a buffer. Many banks therefore diminished their corporate and SME loans, in order to lend their money to the European countries.

This whole article is a must-read for everybody, who either can read German or uses Google Translate.

This article proves the perversity of the so-called carry-trades, which banks in many European countries have executed. 

These banks received virtually free money from the ECB, through the LTRO’s. Instead of investing this borrowed money there, where it would really help the European economy, the banks have been spurred by the big, virtually “risk-free”  profits, to fill the financial potholes of governments in the South of Europe.

These governments have used this borrowed money from the commercial banks to kick the can down the road and postpone the inevitable changes, as far as economic reforms are concerned.

So instead that this LTRO money from the ECB helped to reinforce the European economies and industries, thus bringing back growth, it led to further economic stagnation and prolongation of the current ‘status quo’. 

Just like with many other European plans and ‘good deeds’, the negative side-effects have surpassed the original positive cause. And that is what probably will happen with this news ECB LTRO plan too, when it will ever be executed at all:

• First, the number of financially rock-solid, industrial and SME companies is very low. Companies that are financially sound mostly don’t need the money, while companies that do need the money are often not financially sound.
  
• Second, banks don’t want to invest at all in (especially) SME companies. The profits are still very low, in comparison with the administrative expenses for handing out these loans safely and the substantial risk for defaulting customers, that the banks run with every loan. This will hardly change with the arrival of “free” ECB money;
  
• The risk buffers and collateral that are needed in order to hand out such loans are just too expensive, to make these loans really profitable;
  
• Banks reinforced their approval process to absurd levels, in order to diminish the number of defaults on bank loans;
  
• Banks therefore will just 'go through the motions', when it comes to handing out loans to industrial and SME companies and will use the rest of the money in much more lucrative carry trades after all.
  
• Third, spurring the supply of goods and services does not do anything about the demand for these goods and services, except for enabling some new jobs;
  
• Although there are some green shoots all over Europe, there is still a consumer strike in many European countries;
  
• Even when the money would be used to spur exports to countries outside Europe, the success rate would be questionable: the US economic revival seems to stall currently, while the situation in the BRIC’s seems to have deteriorated over the last few months;
  
• Fourth, the German government and the German constitutional court in Karlsruhe seem to be totally against every action of the ECB, which takes place beyond their grasp.
  
• Both institues want to have the ECB at the shortest possible leash and they will probably find ways to sabotage this plan.

Summarizing, this plan by the ECB seems to be a ‘nice’ and ‘sympathetic’ idea, but I’m afraid that it’s ‘dead on arrival’, before the first euro has been handed out by the ECB.

On top of that, is seems useless  to these eyes, to sponsor the supply side (i.e. companies producing goods and services) with cheap loans, without doing anything about the demand side (the European consumers, who have virtually stopped consuming).

It would be a shame when this third LTRO would end, being ‘wasted money’ again, just like the previous two LTRO’s seem to have been.

“Help, we lost our AAA credit rating!” What the Dutch government should do about losing its AAA credit rating from Standard and Poors, but blatantly fails to do.

Now don't be sad (Don't be sad)

'Cause two out of three ain’t bad

Meatloaf - Two Out Of Three Ain't Bad

Last Friday, Standard & Poors had bad news for the Dutch government: a downgrade to AA+ from the cherished AAA credit rating for The Netherlands.

The explanation of this downgrade by Standard & Poors was crystal clear and left little room for denial or for blaming the messenger:

In our view, The Netherlands' growth prospects are now weaker than we had previously anticipated, and the real GDP per capita trend growth rate is lower than that of peers at similarly high levels of economic development.

After contracting by a projected 1.2% in 2013, we expect The Netherlands' real GDP to grow by 0.5% in 2014 and to slowly accelerate to 1.5% by 2016, about half the average annual rate of 2004-2007 and well below the long-term trend (1994-2009: 2.4%). We calculate The Netherlands' real GDP per capita trend growth in 2006-2016 at -0.1%, significantly below our long-term per capita growth expectations of between 0.3% and 1.5% for The Netherlands' peer group, which our ratings methodology defines as sovereigns whose economies produce a per capita GDP in excess of $27,000.

We do not anticipate that real economic output will surpass 2008 levels before 2017, and believe that the strong contribution of net exports to growth has not been enough to offset a weak domestic economy. Average real consumption and investment growth have contracted in 2009-2013 (and we expect private consumption to stagnate further in 2014 and 2015), despite the European Central Bank's accommodative monetary policy.

Consumer spending has been dampened by high household debt levels and falling house prices. Household indebtedness was 110% of GDP at June 30, 2013 and house prices have fallen by 20% from their peak, and we expect a further small decline in 2014. According to the Dutch National Bank (DNB), 16% of all Dutch households have mortgage debt higher than the value of their property. According to data compiled by the DNB, households held 280% of GDP financial assets at June 30, 2013. However, nearly two-thirds of this is invested in at least partly restricted pension plans.

Consumer confidence may also be affected by rising unemployment. The European Commission estimates this will reach 8% in The Netherlands in 2014 (compared to less than 4% in 2009). Generally, reduced government spending has weighed on growth. Although improving, capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector remains under 80% (compared to a long-term average of close to 85%), reducing the likelihood of a meaningful and sustained turnaround in investment until confidence and demand fully return.

The Netherlands' external accounts continue to support the ratings. We expect

current account surpluses to increase to an average of 10% of GDP in 2013-2016, from 8% in 2009-2012. Constant external surpluses have resulted in a net external asset position of 50% of GDP in 2013, which we expect to increase to 70% by 2016. Although The Netherlands' overall international investment position is very strong, portfolio and foreign direct investment are prominent in its external assets while many of its external liabilities are in the form of debt. We expect short-term external debt by residual maturity (much of which pertains to the financial sector) to remain above 170% of current account receipts through 2017.

We are therefore lowering our long-term sovereign credit ratings on The Netherlands to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. Although The Netherlands' less-promising economic prospects will make it more challenging for the government to achieve its fiscal targets, we believe that the policy consensus in favor of containing public debt and deficits will be maintained.

We have therefore assigned a stable outlook to the long-term ratings. This reflects our view of limited additional downside risk to The Netherlands' creditworthiness.

The Dutch government, represented by PM Mark Rutte and the ministers Henk Kamp (Economic affairs) and Jeroen Dijsselbloem, reacted as could be expected from them: with a mixture of disbelief, disappointment, fatalism and blatant denial of what happened.

Summarizing, they said: “This will not have much effect on the interest rates of our treasuries and sovereign bonds. Further, we know that we are on the right track with our measures for the Dutch economy and we remain doing the same with even more energy”. Or something like that…:

Dutch finance minister Dijsselbloem:

Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem states in a reaction ‘to not treat the downgrade as a warning, but rather as an encouragement’.

“The cabinet is busy with putting the state budget in order and carrying through the structural reforms, which are needed in order to enable just that we will have more economic growth in the future”, according to Dijsselbloem.

According to him, the relatively weak growth is first and foremost the result of structural problems in the economy: the labour market, the housing market and the pensions. Dijsselbloem does not expect that the credit rate reduction will have dramatic results for the national treasury: “There are still few countries that have a higher rating than we do. Two rating agencies still maintain a triple-A rating and now one gives us a AA+. We are still among the top of the world with such ratings. I don’t expect large interest effects from this rate change”.

PM Mark Rutte and Minister of Economic Affairs Henk Kamp

PM Mark Rutte calls the loss of the Dutch triple A credit rating at rating agency Standard & Poor's ‘disappointing’. He does not expect any major changes to the current interest rates, for which the Dutch state borrows money. According to the Prime Minister, it is important that the interest rates remain containable. Rutte thinks that the rate reduction has already been priced in in the Dutch interest rates.

The cabinet is convinced that it is ‘at the right track’, in spite of the loss of the AAA-rate, according to minister Henk Kamp. Rutte emphasizes that, with a percentage of 2% on 10y state loans, the interest is extremely low, from a historical point of view. 

The PM thinks that The Netherlands still enjoys the confidence of the financial markets. “There are only few countries with a triple A rating and The Netherlands has one with two rating agencies. We need to continue bringing the government budget in order and reinforcing the Dutch economie through reforms. This rate change is a confirmation that we should continue the economic path that we chose”.

Jeroen Dijsselbloem and Mark Rutte, during their driver’s exam some 20-odd years ago: “Yes, mister examiner. I consider the fact that I failed my exam with you not as a warning, but as an encouragement to follow the same road more intensively”.

I am aware that politicians are truly masters in spinning a defeat, until it becomes a victory. Nevertheless, I consider this ‘encouragement’ reaction by Rutte and Dijsselbloem as a new low in the credibility of politics in The Netherlands. 

The Netherlands got its b*tt kicked by Standard and Poor’s, and they see it as an encouragement. Further, the additional reactions from both Dijsselbloem and Rutte (which seem quite orchestrated, by the way) remind me of a very good Meatloaf song: “Don’t be sad. Two out of three (rating agencies) ain’t bad”.

Both Rutte and Dijsselbloem have only scored few points, concerning the problem zones in the Dutch economy, which were mentioned by Dijsselbloem himself. The pension plans of this cabinet have been received with scornful laughter in the First Chamber of Parliament (i.e. the senate) and the cabinet's plans for both the labour market and the housing market (“all five versions of those in the past 13 months) seem to be ‘dead on arrival’.

What makes their reaction even worse; it is a total denial of what is going on in The Netherlands, Europe and the world: the economic AND psychological changes in the global societies, after an impressive series of debt and credit bubbles and cumulative imbalances exploded with a gargantuous bang.

Everybody with half a brain can see that the world has changed dramatically since – say – 2006:

• Risk awareness is up everywhere in the world, except for some diehard London and Wall Street bankers;
• The attitude of the average citizen in the western world towards debt has changed from positive to very negative;
• People have become very cautious with spending money: boundless, hedonistic consumption among every level in the population has been replaced with ‘people counting every penny before they spend it’;
• People don’t do more with less money; they do just less with much less money. Not only because they should do so, but also because that is what they desire to do;
• Extravagance is not a virtue anymore, but merely a sign of bad taste;
• Compassion and empathy for and understanding of other people made way for feelings of disdain, public outrage and revenge towards other people;
• Workers and employees often lost their status as ‘capital of the organization’ in exchange for being ‘durable means of production’ and being treated likewise;
• Workers and employees (especially at the bottom of the labour market) know that there is always someone, who asks less money for the same job. This started a race to the bottom in some industries and fields of work;
• A culture of settling the score with perpetrators of any kind of crime or misdemeanor has come over the world: the online lynch mob emerged, which sometimes even changed into a real one;
• Europe has changed from 'an institute that brought international cooperation, friendship, peace and understanding all over Europe', into ‘a bureaucratic, undemocratic and  scary monster that takes away everything that we care for and brings endless flows of immigrants, who steal our money and take our jobs’;
• Even liberal-conservatives, close to the centre of the political spectrum, speak of the EU, as a ‘trade zone’ that enables free trade in Europe: it has been and should be nothing more than just that!
• Hardly concealed nationalism, xenophobia and religious extremism loom everywhere around the globe;
• And there are dozens and dozens of other signals, that the world is not what it used to be in 2006. 

And the cabinet Mark Rutte thinks that you can change all these circumstances and attitude changes with 'just a few pushes of a button' in the Dutch labour market, housing market and pension industry?! 

Really?! This is so naive!

People just don’t start consuming again, after Rutte gets his state budget in order and after just a few changes in the Dutch housing and labour market. 

And there is no way that the Dutch economy will recover when only export is up, but consumption remains at the same, historically low level.

Nevertheless, I consider the comments of Standard and Poor’s to be very sensible and useful:

• Also S&P emphasizes that growing Dutch exports are not enough to lift up the whole Dutch economy, when domestic consumption lags behind so much. Especially as exports is not such a success as some pundits make you believe;
• Although the Dutch housing market is not the only reason for lagging consumption, I agree with S&P’s that it is an import one. The Dutch housing market needs more and better attention than it gets from ‘Housing Minister’ Stef Blok, with his five, separately ‘crashed-and-burned’ propositions for  the housing market in 2013;
• Dutch unemployment is both a cause and a catalyst for more economic hardship and diminishing consumption. (Again), it is impossible that the Dutch economy will really show any significant growth when unemployment is still going up. It just won’t happen. 

What the Dutch government should have done, but at which it failed blatantly, is:

• Taking the hard measure to abolish the Mortgage Interest Deductability through a 5-10 year schedule, in which the current tax breaks are used as a stimulus for (especially) middle and lower class people to reduce their mortgage debt. 

• Taking measures in the labour market that give younger people more and older people a little less job security;
• The cabinet should do so by altering the flex and zero hour contracts, which are currently much too flexible for employees to feel safe and appreciated in their lives;
• at the same time, the cabinet should make the fixed contracts for older workers less rigid and unfavourable for employers. Once an elderly worker is fired nowadays, he is virtually without a chance of getting a new job;
• Taking measures in the labour market that reduce the devastating effects of too many years of wage restraint (and reduction), by making it fiscally more attractive for companies to pay their personnel higher wages and hourly fees;
• Spurring a restructuring operation within the building and construction industry, in which:
• unhealthy and unviable companies are liquidated in order to diminish the excess capacity in the CRE and RRE market;
• the structurally superfluous workers are trained and educated for a different job in the future;
• Taking measures to restructure the structural overcapacity and vacancy in the Commercial Real Estate market and preventing local government from adding yet new CRE to this overcapacity;
• Investing in education and innovation again;
• not
• by introducing new mega schools and mega universities with dozens of overpaid managers;
• by introducing yet other educational methods that replace already effective working methods on a two-yearly basis;
• but
• by investing in teachers, children & students and supportive personnel;
• by investing in research centers for both fundamental and applied/practical science;
• Looking for projects that really help the Dutch society and economy to improve:
• No Keynesian bridges to nowhere and roads with a capacity that never will be used fully in full, but
• Projects that spur innovation, trade and manufacturing industry.

Still, this crisis took a lot of time to build up, before it came to surface and it will take a lot of time to break down. 

We must be patient and can’t expect miracles to happen overnight.

Nevertheless, the statement by S&P wasn’t an encouragement; it was a warning!